Abstract-In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRN), there are multiple primary and secondary users in a region, and primaries can lease out their unused bandwidth to secondaries in exchange for a fee. This gives rise to price competition among the primaries, wherein each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for its bandwidth than the other primaries. Radio spectrum has the distinctive feature that transmissions at neighboring locations on the same channel interfere with each other, whereas the same channel can be used at far-off locations without mutual interference. So in the above price competition scenario in a CRN, each primary must jointly select a set of mutually non-interfering locations within the region (which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the region) at which to offer bandwidth and the price at each location. In this paper, we analyze this price competition scenario as a game and seek a Nash Equilibrium (NE). We identify a class of conflict graphs, which we refer to as mean valid graphs, such that the conflict graphs of a large number of topologies that commonly arise in practice are mean valid. We explicitly compute a symmetric NE in mean valid graphs and show that it is unique.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE Radio Networks (CRN) [1] are emerging as a promising solution for the efficient use of spectrum. In these networks, there are two types of spectrum users: (i) primary users who lease certain portions (channels or bands) of the spectrum directly from the regulator, and (ii) secondary users who can use a channel when it is not used by the primary. We consider a CRN with multiple primary and secondary users in a region. Time is slotted, and in every slot, each primary has unused bandwidth with some probability, which it would like to lease to the secondaries. Now, secondaries would like to lease bandwidth from the primaries that offer it at a low price, which results in price competition among the primaries. Price competition is naturally modeled using game theory [16] , and has been extensively studied in economics using, for example, the classical Bertrand game [15] and its variants.
However, a CRN has two distinctive features, which make the price competition very different from oligopolies encountered in economics. First, in every slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. So a primary who has unused bandwidth is uncertain about the number of primaries from whom it will face competition. Setting a low price will result in unnecessarily low revenues in the event that very few other primaries have unused bandwidth, because even with a higher price the primary's bandwidth would have been bought, and vice versa. Second, spectrum is a commodity that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simultaneously used at far-off locations without interference; however, simultaneous transmissions at neighboring locations on the same band interfere with each other. Thus, spatial reuse provides an opportunity to primaries to increase their profit by selling the same band to secondaries at different locations, which they can utilize subject to satisfying the interference constraints. So when multiple primaries own bandwidth in a large region, each needs to decide on a set of non-interfering locations in the region, which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the region, at which to offer bandwidth. This is another source of strategic interaction among the primaries-each primary would like to select a maximum-sized independent set to offer bandwith at; but if a lot of primaries offer bandwidth at the same locations, there is intense competition at those locations. So a primary would have benefited by instead offering bandwidth at a smaller independent set and charging high prices at those locations.
Some progress has been made in addressing the issue of bandwidth uncertainty, both in the CRN setting [10] , [8] and in the context of price competition among multiple firms in the Economics literature [7] . The issue of spatial reuse, however, arises specifically in the context of spectrum trading and has not been investigated either in prior work on price competition in CRNs [6] , [13] , [14] , [24] , [17] , [18] or otherwise. The closest to our work is that of Chawla et al. [2] , which considers price competition in networks where each seller owns a capacity-constrained link, and decides the price for using it; the consumers choose paths they would use in the networks based on the prices declared and pay the sellers accordingly. Note that in our model, the sellers need to decide the locations at which to offer bandwidth as well as the price at each location. In addition, the link capacities are deterministic in [2] , whereas the availability of bandwidth is random in our model. Zhou et. al. [25] have designed double auction based spectrum trades among primaries and secondaries in which an auctioneer chooses an allocation taking into account spatial reuse and bids. However, in the price competition model we consider, each primary independently sells bandwidth, and hence a central entity such as an auctioneer is not required.
In this paper, we analyze price competition in CRNs jointly considering both bandwidth uncertainty and spatial reuse, and specifically focusing on the latter. We formulate the problem 0733-8716/12/$25.00 c 2012 IEEE as a game in which each primary needs to select (i) a set of locations at which to offer bandwidth and (ii) the price of bandwidth at each location. We seek to obtain a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in this game. The challenge in doing so is that, since prices can take values from a continuous set, the strategy sets of primaries are uncountably infinite. So it is not apriori clear whether a NE exists, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE, unlike when each player's strategy set is finite [16] .
We focus on symmetric NE, in which every player uses the same strategy, since our game turns out to be a symmetric game. Our first contribution is to prove a separation theorem (Section II-D), which states that in a symmetric NE, the price distributions used by the primaries at all the nodes are uniquely determined once the independent set selection distributions are obtained. We therefore focus on computing the latter, which in turn provides the joint independent set and price selection strategies, by virtue of our prior results [10] , [8] that characterize price competition in the absence of spatial reuse.
We focus on a class of conflict graphs that we refer to as mean valid graphs. These are graphs whose node set can be partitioned into d disjoint maximal independent sets I 1 , . . . , I d , for some integer d ≥ 2, and which satisfy another technical condition to be introduced later (in Section III). As we show in Section V, it turns out that the conflict graphs of a large number of topologies that arise in practice are mean valid. In particular, several lattice arrangements of nodes in two and three dimensions are mean valid, e.g., a grid graph in two dimensions, such as that in part (b) of Fig. 2 or Fig. 3 , which may be the conflict graph of shops in a shopping complex, the conflict graph of a cellular network with hexagonal cells (see Figs. 4 and 5), a grid graph in three dimensions, which may represent offices in a corporate building (see Fig. 6 ) etc.
We show that a mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE; in this NE, each primary offers bandwidth only at some or all of the independent sets in I 1 , . . . , I d with positive probability and with 0 probability at every other independent set. These probabilities (and thereby the NE strategies) can be explicitly computed by solving a system of equations that we provide. The fact that primaries offer bandwidth with a positive probability at only a small number of independent sets is a surprising result, because in most graphs, including the examples in the previous paragraph, the number of independent sets is exponential in the number of nodes. Our characterization of the symmetric NE also reveals that when the probability q that a primary has unused bandwidth is small, primaries only offer bandwidth at the larger independent sets out of I 1 , . . . , I d and as q increases, primaries also start offering bandwidth at the smaller ones. This is because, for given prices, a larger independent set yields a larger revenue. However, as q increases, the price competition at the large independent sets becomes intense and drives down the prices and revenues at those independent sets. So primaries also offer bandwidth at the smaller independent sets. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the model and problem statement, and provide a summary of the results on price competition at a single location that were developed in our prior work [8] , [10] . We introduce mean valid graphs in Section III and provide several examples. In Section IV, we prove the theorem, discussed above, on characterization of the unique symmetric NE in mean valid graphs, and in Section V, we show that the example graphs described in Section III are indeed mean valid. Finally, we present numerical studies in Section VI and provide conclusions and directions for future research in Section VII. Due to space constraints, we only outline the proofs of the analytical results and relegate the complete proofs to our technical report [11] .
II. MODEL, PROBLEM DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

A. Model
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 primaries, each of whom owns a channel throughout a large region which is a geographically well-separated or separately administered area, such as a state or a country 1 . The channels owned by the primaries are all orthogonal to each other. Time is divided into slots of equal duration. In every slot, each primary independently either uses its channel throughout the region to satisfy its own subscriber demand, or does not use it anywhere in the region. A typical scenario where this happens is when primaries broadcast the same signal over the entire region, e.g., if they are television broadcasters. Let q ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that a primary does not use its channel in a slot (to satisfy its subscriber demand). For tractability, we assume that the probability q is the same for all primaries. Now, the region contains smaller parts, which we refer to as locations. For example, the large region may be a state, and the locations may be towns within it.
We assume that there are k secondaries at each location 2 . Each secondary may be a local provider or even a user seeking to lease spectrum bands to transmit data on an ondemand basis. In practice, k may be greater than, less than or equal to n, e.g., the number of TV broadcasters (primaries) broadcasting in a state (which in this case is the large region under consideration) may be greater than, less than or equal to the number of cellular network providers (secondaries) within towns which constitute the individual locations, depending on the specifics of the TV and the cellular provider businesses in the state.
A primary who has unused bandwidth in a slot can lease it out to secondaries at a subset of the locations, provided this subset satisfies the spatial reuse constraints, which we describe next. The overall region can be represented by an undirected graph [23] 
where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges, called the conflict graph, in which each node represents a location, and there is an edge between two nodes iff transmissions at the corresponding locations interfere with each other. Note that graphs have been widely used to model ad hoc networks, wherein wireless devices are modeled as nodes in an undirected graph, with mutually interfering nodes being connected by an edge [22] , [5] . However, the concept of spatial reuse in our paper is more closely related to the corresponding notion in cellular networks, where cells are represented by nodes in an undirected graph, with interfering cells corresponding to neighbors in the graph [20] . Recall that an independent set [23] (I.S.) in a graph is a set of nodes such that there is no edge between any pair of nodes in the set. Now, a primary who is not using its channel must offer it at a set of mutually non-interfering locations, or equivalently, at an I.S. of nodes; otherwise secondaries 3 will not be able to successfully transmit simultaneously using the bandwidth they purchase, owing to mutual interference. Fig. 1 illustrates the model.
A primary i who offers bandwidth at an I.S. I, must also determine for each node v ∈ I, the access fee, p i,v , to be charged to a secondary if the latter leases the bandwidth at node v. A primary incurs a cost of c ≥ 0 per slot per node for leasing out bandwidth. This cost may arise, for example, if the secondary uses the primary's infrastructure to access the Internet.
We assume that p i,v ≤ ν for each primary i and each node v, for some constant ν > c. This upper bound ν may arise as follows. (1) The spectrum regulator may impose this upper bound to ensure that primaries do not excessively overprice bandwidth even when competition is limited owing to bandwidth scarcity or high demands from secondaries, or when the primaries collude. (2) Alternatively, the valuation of each secondary for 1 unit of bandwidth may be ν, and no secondary will buy bandwidth at a price that exceeds its valuation. We assume that the primaries know this upper limit ν.
Secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer the lowest price. More precisely, in a given slot, let Z be the number of primaries who offer unused bandwidth at a node. Then, since there are k secondaries at each node, the bandwidth of the min(Z, k) primaries that offer the lowest prices is bought (ties are resolved at random) at the node. We consider an additive utility function, which is natural in the context of monetary profits. So the utility of a primary i who offers bandwidth at an I.S. I and sets a price of p i,v at node v ∈ I is given by (p i,v − c), where the summation is over the nodes v ∈ I at which primary i's bandwidth is bought. (The utility is 0 if bandwidth is not bought at any node).
Thus, each primary must jointly select an I.S. at which to offer bandwidth, and the prices to set at the nodes in it. Both the I.S. and price selection may be random. Thus, a strategy, say ψ i , of a primary i provides a probability mass function (p.m.f.) for selection among the I.S. and the price distribution it uses at each node (both selections contingent on having unused bandwidth). Note that we allow a primary to use different (and arbitrary) price distributions for different nodes (and therefore allow, but do not require, the selection of different prices at different nodes), and arbitrary p.m.f. (i.e., discrete distributions) for selection among the different I.S.
Note that if k ≥ n, the number of buyers at every node is always greater than or equal to the number of sellers. Thus, each primary sells its available bandwidth at any location at which it offers bandwidth provided it selects a price that does not exceed the maximum allowed value ν. Thus, the strategy of offering bandwidth at a maximum-sized I.S. and setting the price ν at every node in the I.S. maximizes the utility of each primary i regardless of the strategies of the other primaries. Thus, we only need to investigate the case k ≤ n − 1, which is what we assume henceforth.
Finally, we briefly discuss some implementation issues. One way to implement the trade between primaries and secondaries could be as follows. There would be a separate control channel, different from the channels owned by the primaries. At the beginning of every slot, each primary who has unused bandwidth announces over the control channel, the set of locations it is offering bandwidth at and the prices at those locations. Secondaries in each location then communicate with the primaries over the control channel and buy bandwidth from the primaries who quote the lowest prices.
B. Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
The vector (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) of strategies of the primaries is called a strategy profile [15] . Let
. . , ψ n ) denote the vector of strategies of primaries other than i. Let E{u i (ψ i , ψ −i )} denote the expected utility of primary i when it adopts strategy ψ i and the other primaries adopt ψ −i . We use the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept, which has been extensively used in game theory in general and wireless network applications in particular to predict the outcome of a game. Several arguments have been proposed in the literature for using NE as a solution concept, e.g. it is a necessary condition if there is a unique predicted outcome to a game, a strategy profile can be a "focal point" only if it is a NE etc. (see Section 8.D in [15] for a detailed discussion).
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium (NE), Symmetric NE):
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile such that no player can improve its expected utility by unilaterally deviating from its strategy [15] . Thus, (ψ * 1 , . . . , ψ * n ) is a NE if for each primary i:
Equation (1) says that when players other than i play ψ * −i , ψ * i maximizes i's expected utility; ψ * i is said to be its best response [15] to ψ * −i . Now, note that in the game defined in Section II-A, all the n players (primaries) have identical strategy sets and utility functions. Such a game is said to be a symmetric game. Symmetric NE have been advocated as a solution concept for symmetric games by several game theorists [3] , since in practice, it is challenging to implement a NE that is not symmetric 4 . The natural question now is whether there exists a symmetric NE, and also whether it is unique. Note that some symmetric games are known to have multiple symmetric NE, e.g. the "Meeting in New York game" (see [15] , p. 221). We show the existence of a symmetric NE, by explicitly computing one, and prove that it is the unique symmetric NE in our context.
C. Single Location
In this subsection, we briefly summarize the main results for price competition among multiple primaries and secondaries at a single location, which were dealt with in detail in [10] , [8] .
Since there is only one location, there are no spatial reuse constraints, and the strategy of a primary i is a distribution function (d.f.) ψ i (.), which it uses to select the price. Let
Since each primary independently has unused bandwidth with probability (w.p.) q, w(q, n) is the probability that k or more out of n − 1 primaries have unused bandwidth. We will later use the following fact [10] :
In [10] , we showed that in the price competition game at a single location, there is a unique symmetric NE; in this NE, each primary randomizes over the prices in the range [p, v] using a continuous strictly increasing distribution function (d.f.) ψ(.), which has been 4 The simple example of two primaries and a NE of (ψ * 1 , ψ * 2 ) elucidates the inherent complications in the current context. If ψ * 1 = ψ * 2 , then since the game is symmetric, (ψ * 2 , ψ * 1 ) also constitutes a NE. If player 1 knows that player 2 is playing ψ * 2 (ψ * 1 respectively), it would choose the best response ψ * 1 (ψ * 2 respectively), but it can not know player 2's choice between the two options without explicitly coordinating with player 2, which is again ruled out due to the competition between the two. For example, consider a network with two nodes v 1 and v 2 connected by an edge, two primaries and one secondary at each node. It can be easily verified that both of the following strategy profiles constitute NEs: (i) primary 1 offers bandwidth at node v 1 and primary 2 at node v 2 and both set the maximum possible price of ν, and (ii) node selections of the primaries are reversed. Neither of the above NEs are likely to be attained as primary 1 will for example not know whether to choose v 1 or v 2 as it does not know primary 2's choices without prior communication with primary 2. Under symmetric NE, all players play the same strategy, and thus this problem does not arise.
explicitly computed (see Theorem 2 in [10] ). Also, under this NE, every price in [p, v] is a best response for each primary and provides an expected payoff of [10] :
D. A Separation Result
Recall that a strategy of a primary consists of a p.m.f. over I.S. and price distributions at individual nodes. We now provide a separation framework from which the price distributions at individual nodes in a symmetric NE follow once the I.S. selection p.m.f.s are determined.
Let I be the set of all I.S. in G. For convenience, we assume that the empty I.S. I ∅ ∈ I and we allow a primary to offer bandwith at I ∅ , i.e. to not offer bandwidth at any node, with some probability. Consider a symmetric strategy profile under which each primary offers bandwidth at I.S. I ∈ I w.p. β(I), where I∈I β(I) = 1. The probability, say α v , with which each primary offers bandwidth at a node v ∈ V equals the sum of the probabilities associated with all the I.S. that contain the node, i.e. Thus, a symmetric NE strategy is completely specified once the I.S. selection p.m.f. {β(I) : I ∈ I } (which will in turn provide the α v s via (4)) is obtained.
E. Node and I.S. Probabilities
Consider a symmetric NE where each primary uses the strategy ψ, under which it offers bandwidth at I.S. I ∈ I with some probability β(I). The probability, α v , with which each primary offers bandwidth at a node v ∈ V is determined by the I.S. distribution {β(I) : I ∈ I } via (4). Now, for simplicity, we normalize ν − c = 1. With w(q, n) as in (2), let:
By Lemma 2, and similar to (3) in the single location case, in a symmetric NE if primaries offer bandwidth at a node with probability α (and play the single-node NE strategy with qα in place of q at that node), then W (α) is the maximum expected payoff that each primary i can get at that node. It gets this payoff W (α) if it sets any price in the range [ν − w(qα, n)(ν − c), ν] at that node. Under the above symmetric NE with strategy profile (ψ, . . . , ψ), each primary offers bandwidth at node v ∈ V w.p. α v . So the expected payoff of each primary i is given by:
From (6), the expected payoff of each primary in a symmetric NE is completely determined by the node distribution 5 {α v : v ∈ V }, irrespective of the specific I.S. distribution {β(I) : I ∈ I } that led to the node distribution. So each primary can choose its best response as long as it knows the node distribution {α v : v ∈ V } chosen by the others. Thus, the strategic interaction among the primaries is completely determined by the node distribution. We now introduce a definition:
Definition 2 (Valid Distribution): An assignment {α v : v ∈ V } of probabilities to the nodes is said to be a valid distribution if there exists a probability distribution {β(I) :
Note that, given a valid distribution {α v : v ∈ V }, a corresponding I.S. distribution can be computed by solving the system of linear equations (4) .
Thus, we can equivalently define the strategy of a primary in a symmetric NE as a node distribution {α v : v ∈ V }. So henceforth, we interchangeably speak of the strategy of a primary as either an I.S. distribution {β(I) : I ∈ I } (note that the price distribution follows by Lemma 2) or a node distribution {α v : v ∈ V }. Also, we say that the symmetric NE is unique if the node distribution {α v : v ∈ V } is unique.
III. MEAN VALID GRAPHS
We now introduce mean valid graphs, which model the conflict graphs of several topologies that commonly arise in practice. In the next section, we show that these graphs have a unique symmetric NE, which can be explicitly computed and has a simple form. 
2) For every valid distribution 7 in which a primary offers bandwidth at node a j,l w.p.
(8) The first condition in Definition 3 says that G is a dpartite graph 8 and has the additional property that each of 5 Although we refer to {αv : v ∈ V } as a distribution, note that P v∈V αv need not equal 1 in general. 6 Recall that an I.S. I is said to be maximal if for each node v / ∈ I, I ∪{v} is not an I.S. [23] . 7 Note that we write α j,l in place of αa j,l to simplify the notation. 8 Recall that a graph G = (V, E) is said to be I 1 , . . . , I d is a maximal I.S.. Next, let {α j,l : j = 1, . . . , d; l =  1, . . . , M j } be an arbitrary valid distribution. Consider the distribution α j,l = α j , with α j as in (8) 0, I = I 1 , . . . , I d , I ∅ }. Thus, Condition 2 in Definition 3 says that in G, the distribution of means corresponding to every valid distribution is valid-a fact that we will extensively use in characterizing the symmetric NE in Section IV.
B. Examples
Technical as Definition 3 may seem, it turns out that several conflict graphs that commonly arise in practice are mean valid. 3) Let T m,m,m be a three-dimensional grid graph (see Fig. 6 ), which may, for example, be the conflict graph for offices in a corporate building or rooms in a hotel. 4) The conflict graph (Fig. 5 ) of a cellular network with hexagonal cells (Fig. 4) . 5) Consider a clique 9 of size e, where e ≥ 1 is any integer. This is the conflict graph for any set of e locations that are close to each other. 
IV. SYMMETRIC NE IN MEAN VALID GRAPHS
In this section, we show that a mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE; in this NE, in the notation of Definition 3, primaries offer bandwidth at all the nodes in I j , j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, with the same probability t j , i.e. α j,l = t j ∀l = 1, . . . , M j , where {t j : j = 1, . . . , d} is the unique solution of a set of equations that we provide.
Let G be a mean valid graph. Suppose there exists a symmetric NE in which each primary offers bandwidth at node a j,l w.p. α j,l , j = 1, . . . , d, l = 1, . . . , M j , where {α j,l } is a valid distribution. Let ψ denote this strategy. In the symmetric NE (ψ, . . . , ψ), by (5) and the discussion just after it, primary 1 gets an expected payoff of W (α j,l ) at node a j,l ; also, by (6), its total expected payoff is:
We now prove that for each j, α j,l = α j ∀l = 1, . . . , M j , where α j is given by (8). Suppose not. By (5) and Lemma 1, W (α) is a strictly decreasing function of α; so primary 1 offers bandwidth with a high probability α j,l at nodes a j,l at which it gets a low payoff W (α j,l ). Suppose now, primary 1 unilaterally switches to a strategy ψ 0 , under which it offers bandwidth at each node in I j , j ∈ {1, . . . , d} w.p. α j . Note that We will next show that this unilateral switch to strategy ψ 0 increases primary 1's expected payoff, which will in turn contradict the fact that (ψ, . . . , ψ) is a NE.
By (6), the total expected payoff of primary 1 if it plays strategy ψ 0 is:
By (9) and (10):
Now, we have the following algebraic fact, proved in our technical report [11] : Lemma 3: Let N ≥ 2 be an integer, α 1 , . . . , α N be real numbers and α =
. Let f (x) be any strictly decreasing function of x. Then:
with equality iff α 1 = . . . = α N = α. Intuitively, since f (.) is strictly decreasing, in the LHS of (12), the terms in which f (α i ) is large are multiplied by small factors α i and vice-versa; on the other hand, all terms f (α i ) on the RHS are multiplied by the same factor α. So the LHS is smaller. Now, as mentioned above, f (α) = W (α) = 1 − w(qα, n) is a strictly decreasing function of α. So by Lemma 3, the expression in (11) The following result provides necessary conditions for a distribution {t j : j = 1, . . . , d} as in Lemma 4 to constitute a symmetric NE. 
Recall that by (7), I 1 , . . . , I d are in decreasing order of size. So Lemma 5 says that primaries do not choose I.S. smaller than a certain size (out of I 1 , . . . , I d ) . Now, consider a symmetric NE with {t j : j = 1, . . . , d} as in Lemma 4. The expected payoff of primary 1 if it offers bandwidth at I j is the sum of the expected payoffs at the nodes in I j , which, by (5) and the discussion just after it, is given by: (14), and using (13) and the fact that W (0) = 1 − w(0, n) = 1, we get:
Thus, we have shown the following: Lemma 6: A distribution {t j : j = 1, . . . , d} as in Lemma 4 that constitutes a symmetric NE must satisfy (13) and (15) for some integer d ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Lemma 6 provides necessary conditions for a distribution {t j : j = 1, . . . , d} to constitute a symmetric NE. The following lemma shows that these conditions are sufficient as well.
Lemma 7: Let 1 ≤ d ≤ d and t 1 , . . . , t d be a probability distribution such that (13) and (15) hold. Then the symmetric strategy profile in which every primary offers bandwidth at each node in I j w.p. t j , j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, is a NE.
The proof of Lemma 7 (see our technical report [11] ) is based on the fact that the graph, being mean valid, satisfies Condition 2 in Definition 3.
The following technical lemma shows the existence and uniqueness of a distribution (t 1 , . . . , t d ) satisfying (13) and (15) for every value of q.
Lemma 8: For every q ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique integer d = d (q) and a unique probability distribution (t 1 , . . . , t d ) such that (13) and (15) hold. Also, d (q) is an increasing function of q and, for every value of q, t 1 
Note that the fact that d (q) is an increasing function of q is consistent with the intuition that for small values of q, primaries tend to offer bandwidth at only the larger I.S. out of I 1 , . . . , I d , and as q, and thereby the competition from the other primaries increases, they also choose the smaller ones. Also, the fact that t 1 ≥ t 2 . . . ≥ t d for all q is consistent with the intuition that primaries offer bandwidth at the larger I.S. with a larger probability.
Finally, putting together the above discussion, we get the main result of this section:
Theorem 2: In a mean valid graph, for every q ∈ (0, 1), there is a unique symmetric NE; in this NE, each primary offers bandwidth at every node in I j , j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w.p. t j , i.e. α j,l = t j , l = 1, . . . , M j , where (t 1 , . . . , t d ) is the unique distribution satisfying (13) and (15). Proof: By Lemma 4, under every symmetric NE, each primary must offer bandwidth at all the nodes in I j , j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w.p. t j for some probability distribution (t 1 , . . . , t d ). Also, by Lemma 6, (13) and (15) hold for this distribution. By Lemma 8, for a fixed value of q ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique distribution (t 1 , . . . , t d ) satisfying (13) and (15) . Finally, by Lemma 7, the strategy profile where each primary uses this distribution is a NE. The result follows.
Thus, every mean valid graph has a unique symmetric NE, which can be explicitly computed by solving the system of equations (13) and (15) . Note that this is a system of nonlinear equations in the variables t 1 , . . . , t d and d . It can be solved using a standard solver for non-linear equations (e.g., fsolve in Matlab) in combination with a search procedure to find d .
Example: Suppose there are n = 2 primaries and k = 1 secondary. Consider a grid graph H m,m , which was introduced in Section III-B, with m = 7 (see Fig. 3 ). By part 4 of Theorem 1, this is a mean valid graph and, in the notation of Definition 3, d = 4, the I.S. I 1 , I 2 , I 3 and I 4 are as described in Section V, and M 1 = 16, M 2 = M 3 = 12, M 4 = 9. The symmetric NE is of the form described in Theorem 2 with d (q), t 1 , t 2 , t 3 and t 4 for different q ∈ (0, 1) as follows: Note that, consistent with Theorem 2, d (q) is an increasing function of q and t 1 ≥ t 2 ≥ t 3 ≥ t 4 for each value of q. In fact, for all q, t 2 = t 3 , which is because I 2 and I 3 are of the same size. Fig. 8 plots t 1 , t 2 and t 4 versus q. For small q, primaries offer bandwidth at the largest I.S. I 1 with probability 1; but as q increases, the competition at I 1 increases, inducing the primaries to shift probability mass from I 1 to the other I.S. So t 1 decreases in q. However, note that for all values of q, t 1 ≥ t 2 ≥ t 4 and t 4 is very small (less than 0.02).
3) For
Remark 1: For simplicity, we have assumed that there are k secondaries at each node, where k is a constant. In practice, the number of secondaries (providers or users seeking bandwidth) may however be random and unequal at different locations and also unknown to the primaries, due to user mobility, varying bandwidth requirements etc. Thus, the number of secondaries at node v ∈ V is K v , where {K v : v ∈ V } are identically distributed random variables such that the primaries apriori know only the probability mass function (p.m.f.) for
All our results extend to this case: we only need to replace w(q, n) defined in (2) byw(q, n) defined as:
V. OUTLINE OF PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We now provide an outline of Theorem 1 and relegate the full proof to our tech. report [11] .
The proof of Part 1 of Theorem 1 is straightforward: let V = {v 1 , . . . , v e } be the nodes of the clique. I j = {v j }, j = 1, . . . , e are disjoint maximal I.S. whose union is V . Since bandwidth cannot be simultaneously offered at 2 or more nodes in V , a valid distribution {α vj : j = 1, . . . , e} must satisfy e j=1 α vj ≤ 1 and hence (8) holds. So the clique is mean valid by Definition 3.
Next, we prove some lemmas that we use to prove the other parts of Theorem 1.
Lemma 9: Let G = (V, E) be a mean valid graph, where
Let E ⊇ E be any set such that no edge in E is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j , j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Then the graph G = (V, E ) is mean valid.
Thus, if a graph G is mean valid, then the graph G obtained by adding edges in any fashion to G, while ensuring that I j , j = 1, . . . , d continue to be I.S. in G , is also a mean valid graph.
Lemma 10:
are disjoint maximal I.S., and |I
for some vector Since the union graph G is a disconnected graph with N components, Lemma 10 is not useful by itself to prove that a graph is mean valid. But it can be effectively used in conjunction with Lemma 9 to combine a set of N mean valid graphs into a new connected mean valid graph by (i) first considering their union, which is a disconnected graph, (ii) and then adding some edges to make it connected.
A useful special case is when each of these N graphs Part (a) (respectively, part (b)) shows the construction of G 6 (respectively, H 4,4 ) from 3 (respectively, 4) cliques of size 2 (respectively, 4) each. The solid edges constitute the cliques G 1 , G 2 , G 3 (respectively,  C 1,1 , C 1,3 , C 3,1 and C 3,3 ) and the dotted edges are those that are added later. The numbers next to the nodes shows the I.S. they are in, i.e., a node labeled j is in I.S. I j , where j ∈ {1, 2} (respectively, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}). Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j ; so the hypothesis of Lemma 9 is satisfied.
∀i, j, M 0 = (1, . . . , 1) and c i = 1 ∀i. This special case can be used to prove the mean validity of several of the graphs mentioned in Theorem 1, as we explain below.
We introduce some notation for later use. For an integer m ≥ 1, let m e (respectively, m o ) denote the greatest even (respectively, odd) integer less than or equal to m.
We now prove part 2 of Theorem 1. Consider a linear graph G m with node set {v 1 Fig. 9 . Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j , j ∈ {1, 2}; so the hypothesis of Lemma 9 is satisfied. Hence, G m is mean valid by Lemma 9. The proof of the fact that G m is also mean valid for m odd is relegated to the technical report [11] . Now, we prove part 3 of Theorem 1. Consider G m,m , where m may be odd or even. Let v ij be the node in the i'th row and j'th column i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}(see part (b) of Fig. 2 ). We start with a line graph G m 2 , which is mean valid by part 2 of Theorem 1, and add some edges to obtain G m,m as shown in Fig. 10 Next, we prove part 4 of Theorem 1. Consider H m,m (see Fig. 3 ). As in G m,m , let v ij be the node in the i'th row and j'th column. Let d = 4, I 1 = {v 11 Fig. 9 ). Note that I 1 , I 2 , I 3 and I 4 are disjoint maximal I.S. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, let C i,j be the clique consisting of the nodes {v i,j , v i,j+1 , v i+1,j , v i+1,j+1 } and the edges among them (see Fig. 11 ). First, let m be even. The proof that H m,m is mean valid is similar to the above proof of mean validity of G m with m even: we can obtain H m,m by considering the union of the cliques C i,j , i, j ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , m − 1}, which is a mean valid graph by Lemma 10, and then adding the remaining edges as illustrated in part (b) of Fig. 9 . Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j , j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; so the hypothesis of Lemma 9 is satisfied. Hence, H m,m is mean valid by Lemma 9. The proof of the fact that H m,m is also mean valid for m odd is relegated to the technical report [11] .
The proof of part 5 of Theorem 1 is similar to that of part 4-see technical report [11] .
We now prove part 6 of Theorem 1. Consider a cellular network as shown in Fig. 4 , whose conflict graph is shown in Fig. 5 . The nodes in the graph can be partitioned into three disjoint maximal I.S. I 1 , I 2 and I 3 as shown in Fig. 5 . We consider this conflict graph with the following assumption, which eliminates problems arising due to boundary effects. 
Assumption 1:
There are an even number, say r, of rows of nodes, each containing 3η nodes, for some integer η ≥ 1. Under this assumption, as illustrated in Fig. 5 , the graph can be obtained by considering the union of rη disjoint cliques of size 3 each, which is a mean valid graph by Lemma 10, and then adding some edges. Note that no edge is between two nodes in the same I.S. I j , j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (see Fig. 5 ); so the hypothesis of Lemma 9 is satisfied. So the graph is mean valid by Lemma 9. Note that the above proof goes through if the graph can be partitioned into cliques of size 3 even if Assumption 1 is not satisfied. If the graph cannot be partitioned into cliques of size 3, then the analysis is more complicated due to boundary effects. We omit this analysis for brevity.
VI. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, we describe numerical computations that are directed towards assessing the impact of price competition among the primaries on the aggregate revenue of the primaries and the affordability of spectrum for the secondaries. Towards that end, we compare the symmetric NE resulting from price competition with a scheme, denoted by OPT, under which all the primaries cooperate so as to maximize the sum of their revenues. We consider two specific graphs: a grid graph H m,m and a linear graph G m , which were introduced in Section III-B (see Fig. 3 and part (a) of Fig. 2 respectively) . By part 4 (respectively, part 2) of Theorem 1, this is a mean valid graph and, in the notation of Definition 3, d = 4 (respectively, d = 2) and the I.S. I 1 , I 2 , I 3 and I 4 (respectively, I 1 and I 2 ) are as described in Section V. Throughout, we use the parameter values ν = 1 and c = 0.
In H m,m and G m , the symmetric NE is of the form in Theorem 2 and under OPT, the I.S. I 1 , . . . , I 4 (respectively, I 1 , I 2 ) are selected in order of size and all the primaries always select the highest price ν.
We refer to the ratio between the aggregate revenues of the primaries under the symmetric NE and under OPT as the efficiency (η) of the symmetric NE. η is a measure of the decrease in the aggregate revenue of the primaries resulting from price competition. For H m,m , Fig. 12 plots the aggregate revenues under the symmetric NE and under OPT and η versus q. The figure reveals, as expected, that price competition significantly reduces the aggregate revenue of the primaries relative to OPT. Also, the figure shows that overall, η decreases as q increases since the competition increases. Fig. 13 shows that the trends are similar for a larger topology (larger m) and Fig. 14 shows that the trends are also similar for G m . For H m,m , Fig. 15 plots η versus k and shows that overall η improves as k increases. This is because, for small values of k, demand for bandwidth is scarce at each node. Under the symmetric NE, bandwidth is wasted at several nodes since more primaries offer bandwidth at those nodes than the bandwidth requirement at those nodes, resulting in a shortage of bandwidth at other nodes. On the other hand, since all primaries cooperate in OPT, it judiciously supplies bandwidth precisely where it is needed. So OPT outperforms the symmetric NE by a large margin for small values of k. For large values of k, the demand is high and so is the tolerable margin of error in assigning the primaries to I.S.; and hence the performance of the symmetric NE improves relative to OPT. Note that Fig. 15 demonstrates that although overall η indeed increases in k in agreement with intuition, this phenomenon cannot be guaranteed for all values of k. For H m,m , Fig. 17 shows that under price competition, the expected price per unit of bandwidth, which is a measure of affordability of spectrum for the secondaries, is lower at the nodes in the larger I.S. This is because primaries prefer larger I.S. and hence the competition is more intense there, driving down the prices. Also, at every I.S., overall the expected price per unit of bandwidth decreases as q increases since the price competition becomes more intense driving down the prices. Fig. 18 shows that the trends are similar for G m .
VII. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We analyzed price competition among multiple primaries in a CRN in the presence of spatial reuse in the symmetric setting in which each primary has unused bandwidth with the same probability and in a class of graphs which we denote as meanvalid. We have proved that there exists a unique symmetric NE in this case, and have characterized this symmetric NE as a solution of a set of non-linear equations. Such equations can be easily solved even for large networks such as those consisting of 600 or more nodes and multiple (e.g., 30) primaries and secondaries. Our numerical computations reveal interesting insights regarding the efficiency of the NE and also the price and independent set selections of the primaries.
It would be interesting to investigate whether the unique symmetric NE is stable to minor perturbations in the selections of the primaries. The characterization of the NE in mean valid graphs in an asymmetric setting and also in general (non mean valid) graphs both in the symmetric and the asymmetric settings remain open. We have recently reported preliminary results regarding the characterization of the NE in the asymmetric setting for the single location case and for a linear topology [9] and also in the symmetric setting in a specific non-mean valid graph [11] . We have also assumed that each primary knows the statistical distributions governing the bandwidth availabilities of other primaries and the number of secondaries at each node. Characterization of the NE when primaries have imperfect knowledge of the above distributions, and seek to enhance their knowledge using learning strategies, remains open. Finally, we have only characterized the NE strategies in a one-shot game. Primaries may play this game repeatedly and may use their experience from previous slots and a learning algorithm to choose their strategy in the current slot. An investigation into whether the symmetric NE for the one-shot game constitutes a steady-state outcome of some natural learning algorithms in such a setting is an interesting direction for future research.
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